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Abstract
This paper has considered an issue which only a few considered in the literature on harmonization of
regional fiscal policies. The lack of attention paid to location distortions may reflect the sense that few
individuals actually move to different states or countries because of differences in fiscal policies. This
study confirms this view for the U.S.; for the U.S. economy as a whole the distortion of location choice
appears to be small. However, for the four percent or so of Americans induced, by regional differences
in fiscal policy, to relocate, the location distortion may range from .5 to 1.5 percent of the present value
of their lifetime consumption – which is not small. In addition, the results suggest that location distor-
tions rise geometrically with the size of regional fiscal differences.
Keywords: Life cycle location choices, regional tax distortions, regional public goods
JEL classification: H73, H71, H72.
1. Introduction
This paper models and estimates for the U.S. in its entirety and for New England the dis-
tortion in choice of location (the decision of where to live) arising from regional differences in
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sistance from Tobias Münzer and Marlis Schairer. All errors remain our own.taxation and the supply of public goods. The model assumes that agents have preferences con-
cerning the region (or country in an international context) in which they wish to live. Differen-
ces across regions in wage, consumption, and capital income taxes as well as in the supplies of
public goods induce those agents who care less about the region in which they live to move to
a region with lower taxes and/or more public goods. The evaluation of the advantages to mo-
ving depend on one’s age. For example, elderly retirees will be particularly concerned about
their chosen region’s consumption and capital income taxes, while young workers will focus
to a greater extent on wage taxes. The model accommodates this life cycle aspect of location
decisions by positing agents who work full time for two periods followed by a final, period of
retirement. At the beginning of each period the agent decides in which of five regions to live.
While production distortions arising from regional differences in fiscal policy are likely to
be important, production distortions have already been studied extensively in the literature (e.g.
Bradford (1978), Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) or Binet (2008)). Another distortion with
which we are not concerned here is the distortion in intertemporal choices arising from capital
income taxes and time-varying consumption taxes. Although our life cycle model features in-
tertemporal utility maximization, to ensure zero intertemporal distortion we assume Leontief
preferences over private goods at different dates. Since our focus is on the distortion caused by
regional tax differences, rather than why such tax differences arise, our model does not seek to
explain the level of regional taxation. Whether regional fiscal differences reflect the type of po-
litical-economic theory offered by Persson and Tabellini (1990) and others or are the outcome
of competition as in Gordon (1983), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1987), and
Wildasin (1988), regional fiscal differences will still entail location distortions.1
When we published a first draft of this model in the early 1990s, we thought that our model
covered a unique question of public finance research at that time Tiebout models were very po-
pular. Tiebout models or Tiebout like models [e.g., Tiebout (1956), Stiglitz (1983), Brueckner
(2006)], however, assume that agents care about the type of community in which they live (i.e.,
its public goods taxes), but are indifferent with respect to its location. Indeed, our model delivers,
as a limiting case, the Tiebout result that perfect location mobility eliminates distortions. This li-
miting case arises in our model when agents are indifferent with respect to regions in which they
live. In the meanwhile, attachment to communities has become a standard enlargement of Tie-
bout models, see for example Mansoorian and Myers (1993). Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2006) look
at the internal migration in Switzerland where there exists a significant tax competition between
cantons (states). They find that migration decisions are not affected by taxes than rather by ac-
commodation-related factors. For Canada, Conway and Houtenville (1998) find out that the pu-
blic sector affects migration of the elderly between Canadian states, however, decisions to move
are not as clear cut as theoretical models would predict. Day and Winer (2006) analyses also for
Canada how differences in states’ unemployment policies affect internal migration. They come
to the conclusion that they are effects which however are rather small. Jones and Whalley (1988)
on the other hand find significant effects of regional taxes for the migration pattern in Canada.
Although there has been a certain amount of research addressing these questions (and our little
survey is far from being plenary), our model provides still the feature of the life-cycle aspects of
tax induced regional distortions which we think is still important and interesting.
48 LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, BERND RAFFELHÜSCHEN AND CHRISTIAN HAGISTThe paper continues in Section 2 with a presentation of the model. Section 3 shows how
the model’s key parameters can be estimated by simulating the likelihood of particular loca-
tion decisions. Section 4 discusses the use of U.S. census and state tax and expenditure data
to estimate the model for both a five region subdivision of the 50 U.S. states as well as a five
region subdivision of the six states of New England. Section 5 presents estimates for the U.S.
and New England of the location distortion arising from inter-regional tax and public goods
differences while Section 6 summarizes the our findings.
2. A Multi-Period Multi-Regional Model of Locational Choice
2.1. Preferences
Our model assumes that a set of compensated regional taxes is introduced at time t.
Equation (1) specifies the lifetime utility Ui,s of the i-th agent of generation s≥t. The state-
ment that an agent is a member of generation h means that he was young at time h:
(1)
There are three components to lifetime utility. The first component, represented by the
first three terms on the right hand side of (1), indicates the agent’s utility from his choice
of location when young (y), middle age (m) and old (o). The second component, involving
the minimum function, specifies the agent’s utility from consumption when young, middle
age, and old. The third component, represented by the last three right hand side terms, de-
termines the utility from consuming public goods when young, middle age, and old. There




(1) denote, respectively, the locational utility the i-th member of generation s enjoys when
young, middle age, and old. The value of the terms depend, respectively, on the region of
residence.
Turning to the second utility component, the terms cy
i,s,cm
i,s and co
i,s, respectively, for the
i-th member of generations’ consumption. The parameter ρ is the time preference factor
determining the shape of the age-consumption profile, and the parameter α scales prefe-




for the region-specific public goods per capita (divided by the region’s population) enjo-
yed by the i-th member of generation s. While each agent living in a specific region en-
joys the same public goods per capita, we index Gy
i,s,Gm
i,s and Go
i,s by i to indicate that the
amount of regional per capita public goods enjoyed by agent i depends on agent i’s loca-
tion decisions.2 The term β scales preferences for regional public goods relative to loca-
tion and private goods.
The utility of the i-th member of generation t-l, who is middle age at time t when the re-
gional taxes are introduced is given by:
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and the utility of the i-th member of generation t-2, who is old at the time t, is
(3)
In equations (2) and (3) we assume that, for the initial old and middle age generations
the utility function is of the form given in (1), but restricted to their remaining years of life.3
In the following we will make strong assumptions about the fiscal and production sec-
tor which recent research (e.g. Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) and Morgan, Mutti and Partrid-
ge (1998)) has shown probably unrealistic. However, as we want to focus solely on the dis-
tortions of local taxes on location choices, these assumptions are unfortunately necessary.
2.2. Budget Constraints
If the i-th member of generation s chooses to live in region j when young, k when mid-
dle age, and l when old, he faces the following present value budget constraint
(4)
where the symbols τf, θf, and υf stand, respectively, for the consumption, capital income and
wage tax rates in region f ∈(j,k,l) while the terms w and r stand for the pre-tax wage and in-
terest rates. Since, as described below, w and r are identical in all regions, they have no re-
gional index. The terms T y
s, T m
s and To
s stand, respectively, for the lump-sum rebate of taxes.
The rebates are given in equal amounts to all members of generation s regardless of where
they choose to locate. Finally, the terms Qy
s, Qm
s and Qo
s stand for the lump-sum taxes asses-
sed equally on all members of generation s to pay for regional public goods again regardless
of where they choose to locate. The time t budget constraint for the i-th member of genera-
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i,t-1 stands for the net wealth of the i-th member of generation t-1 at the beginning of
his second (middle age) period of life.
For the i-th member of generation t-2, if he elects to live in region 1 in his last period of
life (time t), his budget constraint is
(6)
where Ao
i,t-2 stands for the net wealth at the beginning of the agents t-2 last period of life.
2.3. Utility Maximization
Maximization by the i-th member of generation s (s≥t) of (1) subject to (4) implies the
first order conditions:
(7)
These equations plus (4) can be used to solve for the i-th member of generation s’ indi-
rect utility Vi,s(j,k,l) conditional on the location sequence. The optimal 1ifetime location se-
quence j-j*, k-k*, and l-l* satisfies
(8)
The i-th member of generation t-1’s utility maximization is directly ana1ogous:
(9)
Equations (9) and (5) determine the demand functions for consumption when midd1e
age and old for the i-th member of generation t-1 conditiona1 on the location sequence
(k, l). Let Vi,t-1(k,l) denote the i-th member of generation t-l’s indirect utility:
(10)
For the i-th member of generation t-2 the level of old age consumption conditional on
location choice 1 is implicitly defined in equation (6). Let Vi,t-2(l) be the indirect utility of
this agent:
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This subsection describes our method of compensating the region-specific taxes paid by dif-
ferent cohorts and our method of financing region-specific public goods expenditures. To focus
attention on the location distortion arising from regional differences in tax policy we assume a
central government receives the regional tax revenues and returns them to agents in a lump-sum
manner independent of their locational choice. To avoid intergenerational redistribution, the
central government’s compensation is cohort-specific. This paradigm of a central government
imposing region-specific taxes, but rebating these taxes to all agents regardless of where they
live clarifies the distortive nature of region-specific taxes. Since these taxes are not used to fi-
nance specific government programs, they serve only to alter locational choices. If agents did-
n’t care about the region in which they lived the government’s action would not alter any agen-
t’s welfare. In this case all agents in a cohort would choose the same j* location when young,
the same location k* (not necessarily equal to j*) when middle aged, and the same location l*
(not necessarily equal to j* or k*) when old. Since taxes are rebated they would face the same
lifetime budget as without taxes. While they would potentially face capital income and con-
sumption taxes that differ across their three periods of life, these compensated taxes would cause
no reduction in utility through an intertemporal distortion because of our assumption of Leon-
tief intertemporal preferences. In the situation of interest in which agents care about where they
live and do not all choose the same location sequence, the compensated region-specific taxes
serve to redistribute between those members of a cohort that choose different location sequen-
ces. However, as indicated in subsection 2.6, this redistribution causes no excess burden.
Equations (12)-(14) define, respectively, the taxes paid by the i-th member of generation
s (s≥t) when young, Taxy
i,s, middle age, Taxm
i,s, and old, Taxo
i,s. The value of these taxes and
the consumption and asset holdings on which they are based are functions of the optimal lo-
cation sequence j*, k*, l* chosen by the i-th agent of generation s. We suppress this functio-
nal dependence in the notation to limit the amount of notation. We could also subscript j*,




The taxes paid by the i-th member of generation t-1 when middle aged and old, Taxm
i,s
and Taxo
i,s, are defined in equations (15) and (16):
(15)
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52 LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, BERND RAFFELHÜSCHEN AND CHRISTIAN HAGISTFinally, equation (17) defines the taxes paid by the i-th member of generation t-2:
(17)
We assume zero population growth and denote by I the number of members of each
cohort. The per-cohort member lump-sum compensation out of equations (4) to (6) are de-
fined as:
(18)
2.5. The Non-Distortionary Finance of Region-Specific Public Goods
We assume that private and public goods are the same commodity (produced with
identical production functions). To focus attention on the location distortion associated
with regional differences in per capita public goods expenditures we assume that regional
public goods are financed by age-specific lump-sum taxes levied on cohort members.
These lump-sum taxes at a given age have the same value for each cohort member no mat-
ter where she chooses to live. Let J stand for the economy’s aggregate expenditure on pu-
blic goods, where:
(19)
Equation (19) states that at any point in time total expenditure across the economy on
region-specific public goods equals the sum across all individuals –the young, middle age,
and old– of the per capita expenditure they enjoy in their region of choice at that point in
time. At any time s≥t aggregate public goods expenditures are financed by the sum of lump-
sum taxes, i.e.,
(20)
While equation (20) states that total taxes equals total expenditures, it leaves open the
question of how these taxes are distributed across different contemporaneous generations.
We assume that the burden of paying for public goods expenditures is spread across the dif-
ferent contemporaneous generations such that for any s≥t
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53 How regional differences in taxes and public goods distort life cycle location choicesThe substitution of equation (21) into equation (20) indicates that each generation’s





s = ρ2J /(1+ ρ + ρ2)I; Qm
s = ρ J/(1+ ρ + ρ2)I and Qo
s = J/(1+ ρ + ρ2)I. Given the presen-
ted regime, one can demonstrate that the aggregate economy’s total (private plus govern-
ment) consumption at each point in time is unaltered by the introduction of the compensated
regional taxes and the lump-sum tax-financed expenditures on regional public goods.
2.6. Calculating the Excess Burden from Regional Tax Distortions
Our calculation of excess burden can be explained by defining for each agent in each co-
hort the amount of lump-sum recompense required to raise or lower his utility in the initial
no-tax steady state to the utility level he obtains with compensated regional taxes. Let Di,t-2,
Di,t-1, and Di,s stand, respectively, for the recompense to the i-th agent of generation born at
t-2, t-1, and s≥t. These terms are defined by
s ≥ t (22)
, and (23)
(24)
In equations (22)-(24) the superscript ^ denotes location and consumption choices in the
initial steady state, and the superscript * denotes these choices in the transition induced by
the compensated regional taxes and changes in the regional allocation of total public goods
expenditure J. The numbers 3, 2, and 1 multiplying the utility from location and public goods
in equations (22)-(24), respectively, reflect the Leontief nature of preferences for private
consumption. Consider, for example, Di,s for s≥t which stands for the amount of additional
resources member i of cohort s needs in the initial steady state to attain the post-policy level
of utility. If we left out the number 3 in equation (22) we would have an expression for the
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54 LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, BERND RAFFELHÜSCHEN AND CHRISTIAN HAGISTamount of additional consumption when young required in the initial steady state by mem-
ber i of cohort s to attain the post-policy level of utility. But since each new cohort spends a
third of its total present value of after-tax resources on consumption when young, one needs
to multiply the required addition in consumption when young by three to obtain the required
addition in resources. In the case of initial middle age and initial old generations the corres-
ponding adjustment factors are two and one.
The present value of the economy’s excess burden, E, along its transition path arising
from implementing compensated regional taxes and/or changing the regional allocations of
spending J equals the sum across all cohort members of the Di,t-2’s, the Di,t-1’s and the pre-
sent discounted value of the Di,s’s (s≥t). The formula for E is given by
(25)
where the minus sign corrects for the fact that the sums of the Di,j’s j≥t-2 are negative.
Consider first the formula for excess burden in the case of zero region-specific public
goods. As discussed above, because of the Leontief preference structure each cohort’s
total consumption at each point in time is unaltered by the introduction of the compensa-
ted regional taxes. Since consumption drops out of equation (25)’s cohort summations of
the Di,t-2’s, Di,t-1’s, and Di,s’s (s≥t), the formula for excess burden E involves only tax-in-
duced changes in the utility from locational choice (changes in the Z y
i,s’s, Z m
i,s’s, and Z o
i,s’s
(s≥t), changes in the Z m
i,t-1’s and Z o
i,t-1’s, and changes in the Z o
i,t-2’s); i.e., there is no excess
burden associated with the utility from consumption. Rather the model’s excess burden
arises solely from distortions in locational choice.4
Next consider the formula for excess burden when there are region-specific public goods
as well as compensated region-specific taxes. To measure the inefficiency of regional allo-
cations of public goods, we need first to specify an efficient regional allocation of public
goods and measure, as excess burden, the departure from that standard. We take as our effi-
cient allocation [the ^ values in equations (22)-(24)] an initial steady state with two charac-
teristics. First, no region-specific taxes and second, a division across regions of total public
goods spending J that is proportional to the division of the economy’s entire population
across the regions that would arise in the absence of region-specific public goods. Since the
utility from public goods depends on public goods per capita, which, by construction, is the
same in each region, this allocation provides agents with no incentive to change location
compared with the case of zero public goods. In addition, since the lump-sum taxes used to
finance the public goods are not region-specific, the financing of the location choices.
One additional condition is required for the ^ public goods allocation to be efficient. This
condition is that ρ=1/(1+r), i.e., that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution betwe-
en public goods equals the economy’s intertemporal marginal rate of transformation. Suppo-



























55 How regional differences in taxes and public goods distort life cycle location choicesacross regions that raises (lowers) some agents’ public goods consumption when young and
lowers it when old, but maintains fixed the present value of the agent’s public goods con-
sumption. This reallocation will raise (lower) the agent’s welfare, and positive (negative) ap-
plications of this policy can produce a Pareto efficiency gain.
With the assumption ρ=1/(1+r) we can show that the excess burden E depends only on
changes in the direct utility from locational choice (changes in the Z y
i,s’s, Z m
i,s’s, and Z o
i,s’s, (s≥t),
changes in the Z m
i,t-1’s and Z o
i,t-1’s, and changes in the Z o
i,t-2’s). To understand why changes in
the utility from private consumption do not enter the formula for E note that each cohort’s total
consumption at each point in time is unaltered by changes in the regional allocation of public
goods spending J. To see this recall that reallocating J across different regions does not affect
the lump-sum taxes financing J and, therefore, does not directly affect any agent’s private bud-
get constraint. The budget constraints of particular agents will, however, be affected because
the new pattern of regional public goods spending may induce some agents to change their lo-
cation choices. Such changes in location choices will, in general, eventuate in the agents pa-
ying different taxes. While the budget constraints of particular agents within a generation may
be altered by changing the pattern of public goods spending, because all taxes (other than those
financing J) paid by a cohort are rebated to the cohort, the budget opportunities for each cohort
as a whole and, therefore, its total consumption at each point in time will be unaffected by re-
gional reallocations of J. This point follows from summing equations (4’), (5’), and (6’) over
their respective cohort members. It is also easy to show that the formula for E does not invol-
ve welfare changes arising from changes in the levels of per capita public goods expenditure
enjoyed by different agents. Given that ρ=1/(1+r) one can use equations (19) and (22)-(24) to
show that all terms involving government consumption drop out of the formula for E.
To summarize, the excess burden E is simply the present value sum across all current and
future agents of the differences between their base case location component of utility and their
location component of utility with compensated regional taxes and distributions of public
goods expenditure that differ from the distribution. Since in the ^ allocation there is no eco-
nomic incentive for an agent to live in one region versus another, location choice is maximi-
zed by each agent. In contrast, the * allocation location choices are influenced by economic
variables, and hence the location component of utility in the * allocation is not maximized.
Since measured excess burden depends only on the difference between the location compo-
nents of utility in the ^ and * allocations, and the utility from location is maximized in the ^
allocation, moving from the ^ to the * allocation will entail a positive excess burden. One
point remains to be made about the calculation of excess burden. The reason we assume that
regional taxes are compensated back to the agents paying these taxes (regardless of where
they live) and that region-specific public goods are financed by lump-sum taxes on agents (re-
gardless of where they live) is to neutralize the income effects arising from regional fiscal po-
licies. Such neutralization of income effects is not special to this model; all excess burden cal-
culations control in some manner for income effects arising from the policy in question [e.g.,
see Diamond and McFadden (1972)]. In controlling for income effects we do not mean to sug-
gest that compensation for regional taxes and lump-sum financing of regional public goods
necessarily arise in the real world, at least not explicitly. The point, however, is that any re-
56 LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, BERND RAFFELHÜSCHEN AND CHRISTIAN HAGISTgional tax and public goods expenditure policies that do not involve compensation and lump-
sum finance can be described as policies without these features plus additional lump-sum
transfers (taxes) across agents, These additional lump-sum transfers (taxes) induce pure inco-
me effects. Once one controls for such additional income effects in calculating welfare chan-
ges, one is left with our measurement of excess burden.
2.7. The Production Sector
Each of the model’s N regions has an identical constant returns to scale production func-
tion given by
(26)
where Yn, Kn, and Ln stand, respectively, for output, capital, and labor in region n. As men-
tioned, capital is assumed to be fully mobile across countries; hence, the pre-tax interest rate
is identical in all regions. Given the constant returns technology this implies identical capi-
tal-labor ratios (equal to the aggregate economy’s capital labor ratio) in each region which,
in turn, implies identical pre-tax wage rates in each country. Letting w and r stand, respecti-
vely, for the pre-tax wage and pre-tax interest rate, we have
(27)
(28)
2.8. The Economic Transition with Compensated Taxes
Let K
–
denote the aggregate (economy-wide) initial steady state capital stock. As de-
monstrated above, given the economy’s pre-tax factor prices, aggregate consumption is un-
changed by the compensated regional taxes and lump-sum tax-financed regional public
goods expenditures. At time t when the compensated taxes are introduced and the regional
reallocation of aggregate public goods occurs, the pre-tax factor prices are determined by the
aggregate economy’s capital-labor ratio, which equals K
–
divided by 2I, the number of young
and middle age agents. Hence, at time t pre-tax factor prices, w and r, equal their initial ste-
ady state values. Since time t aggregate income and aggregate consumption have the same
values as in the initial steady state, time t aggregate saving is the same as in the initial ste-
ady state. This implies that the aggregate capital stock at time t+1 remains equal to K
–
. The
same logic implies that aggregate capital after t+1 is also equal to K
–
. Thus the economic
transition with compensated taxes involves no change in the economy-wide capital stock or
factor prices through time.5 We assume that the distributions of Z y
i ’s, Z m
i  ’s, and Z o
i ’s are sta-
tionary. This assumption and the assumption that I is large implies that the economy reaches
rF K n N n == δδ / ,     ,... , 1
wF L n N n == δδ / ,    ,... , 1
YF K L n N nn n = () = , ,    ,... , 1
57 How regional differences in taxes and public goods distort life cycle location choicesa steady state (with respect to the distribution of locational choices). Indeed, the economy re-
aches its new steady state at time t+2, i.e., in the third period after the taxes are imposed.
During periods t and t+1 the distribution of location decisions of the initial middle age and
old generations will differ from those of middle age and old generations after t+2 because
the initial middle age and old generations did not anticipate facing regional taxes later in life
when they made their location decisions when young, in the case of the initial middle age,
and when young and middle age, in the case of the initial old.
3. Distribution Assumptions and Estimation Strategy
Since the distributions of the Z y
i ’s, Z m
i  ’s, and Z o
i ’s are the same for each generation, we
drop the generation subscript in our subsequent notation. Equation (29) expresses our nor-
malization of location preferences. The location index b in this equation stands for indivi-
dual i’s region of birth. The normalization is that the preference for one’s region of birth
equals unity when young, middle age, and old.
(29)
Equation (30) indicates that for the i-th agent of any generation the utility of living in re-
gion j≠b when young, Z y
i (j), is distributed according to the function, G( ), which we assume
is Gamma.
(30)
The Gamma distribution is determined by a single parameter, ψb,j. By indexing the
Gamma distribution parameter by the region of birth, b, as well as the region of location j,
we permit agents born in different regions to have, on average, different locational preferen-
ces. Since the parameter ψb,j also determines the variance of the Gamma distribution, the va-
riance of the distribution of preferences of agents born in different regions can also differ.6
Equations (31) and (32) indicate that agent i’s utility for region j (j≠b) as she ages evol-
ves as a random walk, where the terms em
i (j) and eo
i (j) and are normal variants with mean
zero and variance equal to s2.
(31)
(32)
To illustrate the import of equations (29)-(32), consider the determination of locatio-
nal preferences of the i-th agent as he ages. First, equation (29) indicates that this agent
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58 LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, BERND RAFFELHÜSCHEN AND CHRISTIAN HAGISThas, at each age, location utility equal to one if he lives in his region of birth. Second,
equation (30) indicates that the utility of the agent when young from living in each region
j≠b is determined by taking a draw from each of the (assumed independent) N-1 distribu-
tions G(ψb,j)j ≠ bfor the N regions not including region b. Third, equations (31) and (32)
indicate how agent i’s preferences for living in region j in middle and old age evolve given
his preferences for living in region j when young. Equations (31) and (32) permit the in-
dividual’s preferences with respect to living in a particular region to change as he ages.
Since these changes in preferences are not systematic, an agent’s locational preferences at
each age are correlated. 
Also note that there is no requirement that agent i prefer his region of birth to living in
other regions. The values of Z y
i (j), Z m
i (j), and Z o
i (j) can exceed unity.
There are 21 parameters associated with these distribution assumptions: four values of
ψb,j(j≠b) for each of the five possible values of b, the region of birth, plus s2. In addition to
these parameter values, the calculation of excess burden requires knowledge of the scaling
parameters α and β and the time preference rate ρ. We estimate α and β together with the
21 distribution parameters. The time preference rate is assumed to equal the interest rate
which is, in turn, determined by the marginal product of capital.
Specifically, we assume that production functions in each region are identical Cobb-
Douglas functions with capital income share equal to 0.25. In using the model to calculate
excess burdens, we normalize w to 1, and salve our model for its equilibrium capital-labor
ratio, and, thus its marginal product of capital.
To estimate the 21 distribution parameters plus α and β we fit modified versions of
our model to U.S. and New England regional data. We assume that the U.S. and New En-
gland are in locational steady states and fit the age-specific location choices observed in
the 1980 U.S. Census to the steady state versions of our modified model. In the modified
models we take factor prices as given, i.e., we do not attempt to estimate the capital in-
come share parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Specifically, we norma-
lize the wage to 1 and assume an annual real interest rate of 1.4 percent.7 We also use the
average tax rates and per capita public goods expenditure observed in 1980 as reported
in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1981, 1982 and 1983) for
1981-83. Since we are estimating only demand side parameters, there is no need to ask
for government budget balance. Hence, our modified models do not assume that regional
taxes are compensated or that regional public goods expenditure is financed through
lump-sum taxation.
Ideally, one would like to have panel data that followed individuals as they changed
or didn’t change their location over their lifetimes. Since, for our purposes, the sample
sizes of the available panel data are quite small, we needed to use the Census data. The
1980 U.S. Census recorded its respondents’ states of birth and their current state of resi-
dence. With these data one can identify all agents within a specified age group (young,
59 How regional differences in taxes and public goods distort life cycle location choicesmiddle age, and old) who were born in a specific region. One can then determine the dis-
tribution of these agents across the regional locations at the time of the Census. These lo-
cation decisions are then matched up against the location decisions predicted by our mo-
dified model.




b,j(x) as the probabilities that an agent born in region b lives in region j when young, mid-
dle age, and old, respectively. The term x stands for the vector of parameters entering our
model. It contains the values of the parameters of the gamma distributions, the 20 ψb,j’s(j~b),




b,j stand, respectively, for the number of young, middle age, and old agents who, accor-
ding to the Census data, were born in region band live (in 1980) in region j. Then the likeli-
hood L(w) of observing the Census data is
(33)
While each individual in the Census has his or her specific location preferences, these
preferences are unobservable. Hence, from an econometric perspective, each individual born
in a particular region has the same age-specific probabilities of living in his region of birth
or in other regions. This explains why the likelihood function treats uniformly all individuals
with the same b, j combination at a particular age.




b,j(x). While one can write down analytical expressions for these functions, they are
highly complex and involve multidimensional integration. As an alternative to determining
these probabilities with an analytical formula (whose evaluation would require numerical
techniques), we use our model to simulate the probabilities. (This is the Lerman and Mans-
ki (1981) simulation estimator; see Pakes (1986) for a similar application of this estimator).
Specifically, for a given choice of the estimable parameters w, we determine from the
model the age-specific marginal location densities for 3,000 hypothetical agents born in
each region. Computation with more than 3,000 hypothetical agents born per region was
not feasible, but 3,000 appears to be large enough, since the parameter estimates do not ap-
pear to be materially different based on only 1,000 hypothetical agents. For each of the
3,000 agents we draw at random their location preferences (their values of Z y
i, Z m
i, and Z o
i )
based on the assumed Gamma and Normal distributions. Next we determine for each agent
his optimal location sequence. This optimization is done by evaluating separately the life-
time utility of each of the possible location sequences and choosing the maximum. Given
these choices we form the fraction of the 3,000 hypothetical agents born in region b who
choose to live in region j when young, middle age, and old. Thus our computer model re-
presents a numerical function determining the marginal location probabilities. It can, ob-
viously, also determine numerically the derivatives used in the maximization of the likeli-
hood function.
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4.1. Regional Divisions and Census Data
Computation limitations restricted our analysis to at most five regions. The reason is that
the number of parameters as well as locational choices which must be evaluated increases
exponentially with the number of regions. Our division of the U.S. into five regions is given
in Table 1. The New England states are also divided into five regions by combining Massa-
chusetts and Rhode Island into one single region. The other four New England regions co-
rrespond to Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, and Connecticut.
The 1980 Census reports for each adult who was born in the U.S. his or her current state
of residence as well as his or her state of birth. In our five percent Census sub sample there
are 136,328 such adults. In our analysis of locational choice among the five U.S. regions we
grouped these 136,328 observations according to region of birth as well as age category. Our
three age categories are 20-39, 40-59, and 60+. We then determined the locational choices of
adults in each age category who were born in a particular region. For example, according to
our Census sample data, there are 3060 adults age 40-59 who were born in the West. Of these
2,671 chose to live in the West, 53 chose to live in the Northeast, 79 chose to live in the Great
Lakes, 109 chose to live in the Plains, and 148 chose to live in the South. These values (2,671,
53, 79, 109, and 148) represent the M m
b,j’s used in the estimation of our model for the U.S.
In the case of our estimation of location choice in New England we considered only
those 5,894 adults in the Census sub sample who were both born in New England and lived
in New England in 1980; i.e., we ignored cases of out migration from New England. We
grouped these 5,894 adults by region of birth within New England and age category and for-
med the values of the M y
b,j’s, M m
b,j’s, and M o
b,j’s used in the New England estimation. Tables
2 and 2a present the 1980 Census location choice data (the M y
b,j’s, M m
b,j’s, and M o
b,j’s) used in
the two estimations of our model one for the five regions of the U.S. and one for the five re-
gions of New England.
As Table 2 indicates, most Americans (roughly three quarters) born in a particular region are
living in that region at a point in time. For example, of 16,805 young (age 20-39) Census respon-
dents who reported they were born in the Northeast, 78.32 percent were still living in the Northe-
ast in 1980. The location that attracted the most young Northeasterners was the South; the South
was the location choice for 10.14 percent of these respondents. An even larger percentage (12.26
percent) of elderly Northeasterners chose to live in the South. Those born in what we call the
Plains are most likely to relocate. Across the life cycle only about half of those born in the Plains
choose to live in the Plains. In contrast, those born in the West are the least likely to relocate to a
different region of the U.S. Roughly 85 percent of Westerners live in the West at a point in time.
If we focus in Table 2a on those New Englanders who chose to remain in New England, we find
an even greater tendency to remain in one´s region of birth. For example, about 90 percent of
those New Englanders born in either Connecticut or Massachusetts/Rhode Island who remain in
New England chose to live in their home state in 1980.8
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Average tax rates are calculated for each of the 50 U.S. states plus Washington D.C. and,
where necessary, aggregated to regional averages base on 1980 state population weights.
Each state’s average income tax rates are derived by simply dividing the state and local in-
come tax revenue by state personal income. Since the data do not permit one to calculate se-
parate wage and capital income tax rates, we assume, in estimating our models, that both of
these tax rates in a given region equal the region’s average income tax rate. State average
consumption tax rates were calculated by dividing state and local sales tax revenue by our
estimate of the state’s consumption expenditure. Our estimate of each state’s consumption
expenditure is based on the assumption that its share of national consumption expenditure
equals its share of national personal income.
In determining each state’s per capita public goods expenditure we divided the state’s
population into the sum of its total (including local government) expenditures on education,
highways, health, hospitals, police, fire, sewerage and sanitation. These per capita expendi-
tures were used to form regional averages (again using population weights), and these regio-
nal averages were used in the estimation of the U.S. and New England models.
Tables 3 and 3a report for the different regions in the U.S. and New England, respecti-
vely, the 1980 average income and consumption tax rates as well as per capita public goods
expenditure. In the case of the five U.S. regions average income tax rates range from 1.6 per-
cent in the South to 4 percent in the Northeast. There is less dispersion in consumption tax
rates; the lowest consumption tax rate is 2.9 percent in the Plains and the highest is 4.1 per-
cent in the West. Table 3 indicates a considerable disparity across regions in per capita pu-
blic goods expenditure in 1980. The West, which had the largest per capita spending, had
43.0 percent larger spending than the South, which had the smallest per capita spending. Tur-
ning to Table 3a, we see that income tax rates in New England range from 1 percent in New
Hampshire to 4.4 percent in Massachusetts/Rhode Island and consumption tax rates range
from zero percent in New Hampshire to 3.6 percent in Maine. The disparity in per capita pu-
blic goods expenditure in New England regions is somewhat smaller. Mass./R.I., whose per
capita expenditure is largest of the New England regions, has 21.6 percent larger per capita
expenditure than does Maine, which has the lowest per capita public goods spending of the
New England regions. It may also be worth noticing that per capita public goods expenditu-
re in New England in 1980 was 13.1 percent smaller than the national figure.
4.3. Parameter Estimates
Tables 4 and 4a present parameter estimates for the U.S. and New England models, res-
pectively.9 They are based on a wage scaled to 1 and appropriately scaled regional per capita
expenditures. Standard errors appear in parenthesis beneath every coefficient. Each table be-
gins with a presentation of the ψb,j’s the parameters of the location preference density func-
tions. These estimates are followed by estimates of σ (the standard deviation of the em
i ’s and
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i ’s) the parameter α that scales utility of private consumption relative to utility from loca-
tion, and the parameter β that scales utility of per capita public goods expenditure relative to
utility from location. With the exception of u all parameter estimates are highly significant.
In considering estimates of the ψb,j’s one should bear in mind that the mean of the gamma
distribution G(ψb,j) is simply l/ψb,j that the variance is 1/ψb,j2, and that the location preference
for living in one’s region of birth has been normalized to unity. All of the ψb,j values in Tables
4 and 4a exceed unity, indicating that the average location preference for living in other regions
(l/ψb,j) is smaller than that of living in one’s region of birth. As one would expect from the lo-
cation choices documented in Table 2, those born in the Plains have the smallest values of
ψb,j’s and thus the largest values of the l/ψb,j’s. For example, the reciprocal of the ψ of those
born in the Plains with respect to living in the West is .81; in contrast, the reciprocal of the ψ
of those born in the Northeast with respect to living in the West is only .38. These figures mean,
roughly speaking, that those born in the Plains view living in the West as worth twice as much
(measured in units of consumption) as those born in the Northeast. If those born in the Plains
are the least attached to their origins, those born in the West and the Northeast are most atta-
ched to their origins; i.e., they typically have the smallest values of the l/ψb,j’s. The estimated
ψb,j’s also indicate a general antipathy for living in the Plains of those born outside the Plains.
The column average of l/ψb,j (which equals .25) for the Plains in Table 4 is the smallest of the
five column averages. The ψb,j estimates in Table 4a indicate that, on average, those born in
Connecticut are, other things equal, the least likely to move to another region of New England.
The average row value of the l/ψb,j’s for Connecticut is smaller than the corresponding avera-
ge row values for the other regions. The largest column average of the l/ψb,j’s is for Massachu-
setts/Rhode Island, indicating that New Englanders find moving to Massachusetts/Rhode Is-
land more desirable, on average, than moving to other parts of New England.
Turning to the other parameter values, there are two points to stress. First, the estimates
of are very small, indicating only minor changes over the life cycle in individual preferen-
ces concerning location. Second, while the estimates of are smaller than the estimates of ,
given the difference in the utility function from consuming private and public goods one
needs to multiply the estimates of by 3 to properly compare the estimates.10 In the case of
the U.S. model, the estimate of of 18.1 is substantially larger than three times the estimate
of (3.3). In the case of the New England model, the estimate of of 11.6 is considerably sma-
ller than three times the estimate of (19.4). As a consequence of these differences in relati-
ve valuation of public goods, the estimated distortion for New England arising from regio-
nal differences in per capita public goods spending is larger than that for the U.S.
5. Estimates of the Location Distortion in the U.S.
5.1. Methodology
Based on the parameter estimates of Tables 4 and 4a we next considered the base case
equilibria for both the U.S. and New England models. Recall that our base case involves zero
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mine total public goods expenditure in our model of locational choice in the U.S. (New En-
gland) by multiplying our model’s net national product by the ratio of total U.S. (New En-
gland) state and local public goods expenditure to U.S. (New England) NNP. In the case of
our New England model we determine New England net national product by assuming that
New England’s share of total U.S. net national product equals its share of total U.S. gross
national product.
In allocating the total public goods expenditure across regions in our base case we first
determined the number of agents who would live in each region in the absence of any go-
vernment public goods spending and then allocated total public goods expenditure in propor-
tion to this regional population distribution. Since this method of allocating total public
goods expenditure leads to equal per capita public goods expenditure across all regions if no
one is induced to relocate and since equal per capita expenditures induces no one to reloca-
te, the base case choice of locations are those that would arise in the complete absence of go-
vernment policy.
Our analysis of the U.S. and New England models are both based on 45,000 agents alive
at a point in time; i.e., 15,000 agents per cohort. The distribution of birth regions of these
45,000 agents is set equal to the distribution of regions of birth of our 136,328 Census ob-
servations. Thus our analyses of the base case as well as policy alternatives to the base case
are each based on a representative regional distribution of the model’s agents. Tables 5 and
5a report for the U.S. and New England, respectively, the location distortion arising from
four different policy alternatives that deviate from the base case. Excess burden is measured
relative to a) the economy’s aggregate present value of private consumption and b) the pre-
sent value of consumption of those agent’s whose location choices have been distorted.
These tables also report the steady state fraction of the 15,000 members of each cohort who
are induced to relocate at least once in their three periods of life by the different policies. Ta-
bles 6 and 6a report for the U.S. and New England the steady state location choices at a point
in time of the 45,000 agents alive at any time for the base case as well as the four policy al-
ternatives. These tables also report the 1980 Census populations by region scaled to the
45,000 aggregate.
5.2. The Distortion from Different Per Capita Public Goods Expenditures
Case 1 considers the distortion arising simply from differences in levels of per capita pu-
blic goods expenditures. In this alternative to the base case, we do not introduce any region-
specific taxes, but we do reallocate the total (U.S. or New England) public goods expendi-
ture assumed in the base case to the different U.S. or New England regions according to the
actual U.S. or New England regional distribution of absolute expenditure. The regional allo-
cation of public goods expenditures are derived from data reported in Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations (1981, 1982 and 1983). In contrast to the base case in which
the same absolute total expenditure is allocated according to the population distribution that
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capita expenditures across regions and induces same agents to relocate. In the case of the
new U.S. steady state 1.06 percent of the 15,000 members of each cohort are induced to re-
locate at least once in their lives. The comparable figure for the New England is 2.68 per-
cent. This difference reflects the larger value of β relative to α estimated for New England
compared to the U.S. For the U.S. the excess burden in Case 1 is .14 percent of the present
value of consumption of those who relocate (including agents alive during the transition path
and in the new steady state). The comparable figure for New England is 1.11 percent. Since
such small fractions of the total populations in the two model are induced to relocate, the ex-
cess burden in Case 1 measured as a fraction of the present value of all initial and future
agents’ consumption is quite small; it is .002 percent for the U.S. and .030 percent for New
England.
5.3. The Distortion from Introducing Region-Specific Taxes to the Base Case
Case 2 considers how introducing the region-specific taxes of Tables 3 and 3a to the
base cases of the two models distorts location choice. In this policy simulation the absolu-
te allocation of total (U.S. or New England) public goods expenditures corresponds to that
in the base case. While the allocation of public goods expenditures doesn’t change, location
choices in Case 2 are distorted not only because of the region-specific taxes, but also be-
cause of differences in per capita public goods expenditures. Per capita public goods expen-
ditures differ across regions in this case because region specific taxes induce a relocation
of same agents across regions, which alters the levels of per capita expenditures (by alte-
ring the total number of agents relative to the fixed amount of expenditures in the different
regions). The excess burdens for Case 2 for the U.S. and New England are, respective1y,
.58 percent and .94 percent of the present va1ue of consumption of those whose location
choices are altered. The percentages of agents induced to move are 3.69 percent for the U.S.
and 2.72 percent for New England. Tab1es 6 and 6a indicate that the region-specific taxes
can make a major difference to the population totals in specific regions. For examp1e, the
New England resu1ts compared with the base case of New Hampshire (a very low tax state)
the population is 12.4 percent 1arger and Massachusetts’ (a high tax state) population is 2.3
percent smaller.
5.4. The Excess Burden from Introducing On1y Region-Specific Taxes
As mentioned, in Case 2 the population shifts induced by region-specific taxes alter the
levels of per capita pub1ic goods expenditures. Regions which set high tax rates lose inha-
bitants, but this raises their per capita public goods expenditure which mitigates the outmi-
gration. In Case 3 we again switch on the region-specific taxes, but this time we endoge-
nous1y adjust the allocation of pub1ic goods expenditure to maintain an equal per capita
level of pub1ic goods expenditures in each region. Hence, Case 3 reveals the excess burden
arising purely from regional differences in taxes. In endogenously adjusting the allocation of
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of total pub1ic goods expenditure in each iteration is set equa1 to the regional population dis-
tribution in that iteration. As one would expect, the excess burden arising in Case 3 exceeds
that in Case 2. Now the excess burden is .64 percent of the present va1ue of consumption of
re1ocators in the U.S. model and 1.62 percent in the New England model. In the case of the
U.S. 4.04 percent of steady state agents are induced to relocate, while for New England the
figure is 4.23 percent.
5.5. The Excess Burden of Actual Region-Specific Taxes and Public Goods Expenditures
Case 4 considers the excess burden arising from actual U.S. and New England tax rates
and regional allocations of total public goods expenditures. As a percentage of the present
value of consumption of relocates, the excess burden is .49 percent for the U.S. and 1.70 per-
cent for New England. Dividing the excess burden by the present value of consumption of
all agents, the excess burden is .017 percent for the U.S. and .083 percent for New England.
A comparison of location choices for Case 4 in Tables 6 and 6a with the scaled Census data
indicates that our models do quite a good job in reproducing actual U.S. and New England
location choices. In the case of the U.S. our model’s predicted regional populations are each
within three percent of the corresponding Census numbers. And for New England, the mo-
del’s regional populations are each within seven percent of the Census numbers.
5.6. Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 7 and 7a report the results of some sensitivity analysis. The first set of results in
these tables are for Case 3, which deviates from the base case only in terms of region-speci-
fic taxes. Our first Case 3 exercise involves doubling all tax rates. For both the U.S. and New
England this leads, roughly speaking, to a doubling of the excess burden per agent affected
as well as a doubling of the fraction of agents who relocate. As a result, excess burden, me-
asured as a fraction of the present value of all agents’ consumption, rises by roughly a fac-
tor of four.
The location distortion arising from regional tax differences depends on the size of tax
differences rather than the level of taxes per se. To consider further the importance of diffe-
rences in tax rates, the next three Case 3 exercises in the two tables double specific tax rates
only in specific regions. For example, the second row in Table 7 considers a doubling of the
New England income tax rate in the U.S. model. This policy leads to an over seven-fold in-
crease in total excess burden [.188 versus .026 (see Table 5)]. For those agents whose loca-
tion choices are altered, excess burden averages almost two percent of the present value of
consumption. Another example is the fourth row in Table 7a. Here we double the income tax
in Mass./R.I. (highest income tax in New England) and also double the consumption tax in
Maine (highest consumption tax in New England). This policy leads to a significant excess
burden for those moving (3.3 percent of their consumption in present value).
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U.S. and New England regional tax and expenditure policy. Here we consider how measu-
red location distortions for the U.S. and New England depend on our estimated parameter
values. Consider first the simulation referenced in the sixth row of Table 7. In this simula-
tion we set the value of a in the U.S. model equal to the estimated value of β, which is subs-
tantially smaller. As one would expect, since the utility of consumption is now less impor-
tant relative to the utility of location, there are fewer agents induced to move because of
regional differences in taxes. Now only .99 percent of steady state agents relocate compared
with the 3.37 percent figure reported in Table 5. Despite the fact that fewer agents relocate,
the excess burden reported in the sixth row of Table 7 is larger than that reported for Case 4
in Table 5. The reason is that the consumption-equivalent value of the location distortion for
those induced to relocate is larger the smaller is α. This can be seen by reconsidering equa-
tions (27)-(30). Thus, while fewer agents in this simulation have their location choice distor-
ted, for those agents induced to move, the distortion is larger (measured in units of consump-
tion). The next row in Table 7, row seven, indicates how raising the value of to β.75 times
the estimated value of α affects measured location distortion for the U.S. Since the value of
does not influence how much agents value consumption relative to location, a higher value
of β serves only to magnify the importance of any regional differences in per capita public
goods expenditure. In this case the U.S. excess burden, measured relative to the economy’s
present value of consumption, more than doubles.
Rows eight and nine in Table 7 consider how raising or lowering α and β by the same
factor alters the calculated excess burden. The results here are not much different from the
Case 4 simulation in Table 5. Finally, row nine examines the impact on the excess bur den
estimates of doubling the value of σ. A higher value of σ spreads out the distributions of the
location preferences and, not surprisingly, implies that more agents will be induced to relo-
cate. On the other hand, those agents who are induced to relocate experience, on average,
roughly the same excess burden compared to the case in which σ is not increased. While the
last five simulations of Table 7 and Table 7a differ quantitively, the basic outcome is quite
similar qualitively , namely that the magnitude of the economy’s excess burden, measured
relative to the present value of its consumption, is not tremendously sensitive to parameter
values.
6. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model to analyze location distortions due to differences in fis-
cal policies (i.e. regional taxes). We stylize this model in the way that only the distortion ef-
fect of taxes is the driver of the model. After explaining our theoretical framework, we esti-
mate our model for the U.S. in its entirety and for the New England states.
Most studies in this area focus on the question of international mobility where taxes and
employment opportunities could be major drivers (e.g. Hafner (2005) or Rasmussen (2004)).
Only a few have studied this question in a fiscal federalism context which probably reflects
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rences in fiscal policies. This study confirms this view for the U.S.; for the U.S. economy as
a whole the distortion of location choice appears to be small. However, for the four percent
or so of Americans induced, by regional differences in fiscal policy, to relocate, the location
distortion may range from .5 to 1.5 percent of the present value of their lifetime consump-
tion – which is not small. In addition, the results suggest that location distortions rise geo-
metrically with the size of regional fiscal differences. Hence, if the profess in the U.S. of
shifting fiscal burdens onto the states continues, the associated U.S. location distortion could
dramatically increase. As our database is from 1980 (Census 1980), it is interesting to see
that a very recent study by Coomes and Hoyt (2008) seems to confirm our findings at least
in qualitative terms i.e. that only large differences in state taxes have a profound effect on
migration between states in the U.S. They use Census data from 2000 which backs our claim
that the randomness of our data sample outweighs the actual point in time from which it were
taken.
Our model is highly stylized, and its results should be viewed as suggestive, not defini-
tive. Our analysis ignores a number of aspects of location choices, such as family connec-
tions, job opportunities, and regional differences in real wages, that are surely at least as im-
portant as fiscal variables in the location choices of any particular individual. We chose to
focus in our model and empirical analysis on regional fiscal differences and to subsume, as
part of location preferences, all other reasons for location choice. Whether this modeling de-
cision biases our estimates of location distortions remains to be seen in our own and hope-
fully others’ future research.
Notes
1. However, as Conway and Rork (2006) point out, it is an interesting question if tax differences induce location
distortions or if tax differences are induced by location decisions.
2. By specifying that a region’s per capita public goods rather than its absolute quantity of public goods enters
utility we are incorporating the assumption that regional public goods are subject to congestion.
3. Since the utility function (1) is not time-separable, the assumption is need to preclude the possibility of some
members of the initial old and middle aged generations choosing, to compensate the regional taxes and regio-
nal public goods, to consume less than their remaining lifetime resources, because consuming more than what
they consumed when young would yield no additional utility. An alternative time-separable utility function
that would yield our assumptions about utility for initial and subsequent generations is an additive iso-elastic
function with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution close to zero. The assumption of a very small inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution is consistent with empirical evidence (e.g., Hall (1988)).
4. The fact that the measure of excess burden does not involve changes in utility arising from changes in con-
sumption is indicative of the statement made in subsection 2.2 that intergenerational redistribution associated
with the compensated regional taxes cancels in our calculation of the economy’s excess burden.
5. While regional fiscal policies in our model have no general equilibrium affects, it does not imply a partial equi-
librium model. If our model generates general equilibrium effects (it doesn’t) and we ignore them by invoking
the assumption of partial equilibrium, we would end up miss-measuring the excess burden from regional fiscal
policies. In our particular model general equilibrium effects turn out to be zero as a result, not an assumption.
68 LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, BERND RAFFELHÜSCHEN AND CHRISTIAN HAGIST6. As indicated, the assumption that the Gamma distributions for each location j ≠ b depend on the region of birth per-
mits agents born in a particular region to have location preferences that differ, on average, from those born in diffe-
rent regions. However, the assumption that the Gamma distributions are independent means that two agents, hand
i, born in the same region, will be equally likely to like or dislike living in region j. We make the assumption of in-
dependent Gamma distributions to limit the number of parameters that need to be estimated. While one would ex-
pect a Californian’s preferences for living in Massachusetts to be correlated with his preferences for living in New
York, our model considers five very large regions within the U.S. over which preferences may be less correlated.
Another feature of the Gamma distribution is that it is left skewed, which in our context means a large fraction of
agents with relatively little interest in other locations and a small fraction of agents with considerable interest in other
locations. Such skewness seems quite plausible for the issue of location preferences, but we must confess that we
chose the Gamma distribution primarily to minimize the number of parameters that needed to be estimated.
7. This is the interest rate we derive in our general equilibrium model. Note that the unit of the sealing parame-
ter α is inversely related to the unit of consumption and the wage; hence, a different normalization of the wage
would lead to a proportionally different estimate of α, but would not alter our calculation of locational excess
burden measured as a percent of the economy’s present value of consumption.
8. We are aware of the fact that our data sample from 1980 seems outdated to the distinguished reader. Howe-
ver, as it is a random selection of one wave of data, we think that the conclusions of our simulation would still
hold with more recent data (see also Cooms and Hoyt (2008)). Updating and expanding the model remains a
job for future research.
9. Our maximization of the likelihood functions uses the Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974) algorithm.
10. To see this consider a young agent at time s increases his lifetime income by a dollar while spending on pu-
blic goods at time s are decreased by a dollar. Since the agent will spend only one third of the dollar on addi-
tional consumption when young, his lifetime utility from private consumption will rise by α/3. In contrast, his
lifetime utility from consuming public goods will fall by β. Hence, the utility gain or loss from this policy de-
pends on the difference between α and three β.
11. Per capita public goods expenditure is in 1980 dollars.
12. Per capita public goods expenditure is in 1980 dollars.
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Resumen
Este trabajo ha  considerado algo que pocos trabajos en la literatura han hecho en el análisis de la ar-
monización de las políticas fiscales: el efecto de las distorsiones territoriales, cuyo impacto puede dar
sentido al hecho de que muy pocos individuos se muevan a diferentes estados o países por diferencias
en la política fiscal. Este trabajo lo confirma para Estados Unidos. Para la economía norteamericana la
distorsión generada por la elección de un determinado lugar de residencia parece pequeña. En todo
caso, un cuatro por ciento de americanos habrían sido inducidos a mover su residencia por diferencias
regionales en la política fiscal mientras que la distorsión territorial estaría entre el 0,5 y el 1,5 por cien-
to del valor presente de su consumo vital - valor que no es pequeño. Además, los resultados sugieren
que las distorsiones aumentan geométricamente con la dimensión de las diferencias fiscales regionales.
Palabras clave: elección de ciclo vital, distorsiones fiscales regionales, bienes públicos regionales.
Clasificación JEL: H73, H71, H72.
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Table 1
REGIONAL AGGREGATION OF THE UNITED STATES
Northeast Great Lakes Plains South West
Connecticut Illinois Colorado Alabama Arizona
Maine Indiana Idaho Arkansas Alaska
Massachusetts Iowa Kansas Georgia California
New Hampshire Michigan Montana Kentucky Hawaii
Rhode Island Minnesota Nebraska Louisiana Nevada
Vermont Missouri North Dakota Mississippi New Mexico
Delaware Ohio South Dakota North Carolina Oregon








DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE BORN IN NORTHEAST AGE
20-39 40-59 60-79
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Northeast 13,162 78.32 8,827 79.35 5,976 77.54
Great Lakes 631 3.75 478 4.30 276 3.58
Plains 208 1.24 75 0.67 37 0.48
West 1,101 6.55 724 6.51 473 6.14
South 1,704 10.14 1,020 9.17 945 12.26
Total 16,806 100 11,124 100 7,707 100
DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE BORN ON THE GREAT LAKES AT AGE
20-39 40-59 60-79
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Northeast 506 2.92 320 2.93 171 2.31
Great Lakes 13,365 77.13 7,985 73.15 5,398 73
Plains 480 2.77 300 2.75 216 2.92
West 1,425 8.22 1,354 12.40 905 12.24
South 1,552 8.96 957 8.77 705 9.53
Total 17,328 100 10,916 100 7,395 100
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U.S LOCATION DISTRIBUTIONS.
DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE BORN IN THE PLAINS AT AGE
20-39 40-59 60-79
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Northeast 69 2.10 52 2.12 45 2.49
Great Lakes 330 10.04 225 9.18 205 11.36
Plains 1,934 58.86 1,263 51.53 856 47.42
West 650 19.78 716 29.21 566 31.36
South 303 9.22 195 7.96 133 7.37
Total 3,286 100 2,451 100 1,805 100
DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE BORN IN THE WEST AT AGE
20-39 40-59 60-79
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Northeast 194 2.43 53 1.73 29 2.10
Great Lakes 261 3.27 79 2.58 35 2.54
Plains 317 3.97 109 3.56 60 4.35
West 6,654 83.30 2,671 87.29 1,208 87.60
South 562 7.04 148 4.84 47 3.41
Total 7,988 100 3,060 100 1,379 100
DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE BORN IN THE SOUTH AT AGE
20-39 40-59 60-79
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Northeast 1,090 5.17 931 6.37 531 5.66
Great Lakes 1,453 6.89 1,530 10.46 742 7.91
Plains 277 1.13 181 1.24 101 1.08
West 1,246 5.91 1,205 8.24 724 7.71
South 17,008 80.71 10,776 73.69 7,288 77.65
Total 21,074 100 14,623 100 9,386 100
Source: US Department of Commerce – Bureau of the Census (1980), Census of Population und Housing, 5 per-
cent sample.
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NEW ENGLAND LOCATION DISTRIBUTIONS.
DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE BORN IN MAINE AT AGE
20-39 40-59 60-79
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Maine 207 77.82 176 75.54 124 84.93
Connecticut 16 6.02 18 7.73 3 2.05
New Hampshire 15 5.64 9 3.86 2 1.37
Vermont 1 0.38 1 0.43 1 0.68
Massachusetts/Rhode Island 27 10.15 29 12.45 16 10.96
Total 266 100 233 100 146 100
DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE BORN IN CONNECTICUT AT AGE
20-39 40-59 60-79
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Maine 5 0.83 1 0.28 1 0.41
Connecticut 536 88.89 332 93 219 90.50
New Hampshire 4 0.66 1 0.28 1 0.41
Vermont 9 1.49 2 0.56 0 0
Massachusetts/Rhode Island 49 8.13 21 5.88 21 8.68
Total 603 100 357 100 242 100
DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE BORN IN NEW HAMPSHIRE AT AGE
20-39 40-59 60-79
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Maine 9 5.52 4 4.17 4 5.63
Connecticut 8 4.91 6 6.25 8 11.27
New Hampshire 123 75.46 73 76.04 47 66.20
Vermont 7 4.29 4 4.17 0 0
Massachusetts/Rhode Island 16 9.82 9 9.38 12 16.90
Total 163 100 96 100 71 100
DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE BORN IN VERMONT AT AGE
20-39 40-59 60-79
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Maine 6 4.80 0 0 1 1.96
Connecticut 6 4.80 7 8.86 6 11.76
New Hampshire 6 4.80 7 8.86 7 13.73
Vermont 99 79.20 53 67.09 30 58.82
Massachusetts/Rhode Island 8 6.44 12 15.19 7 13.73
Total 125 100 79 100 51 100
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NEW ENGLAND LOCATION DISTRIBUTIONS.
DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE BORN IN MASSACHUSETTS/RHODE ISLAND AT AGE
20-39 40-59 60-79
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Maine 29 1.82 14 1.28 9 1.17
Connecticut 47 2.94 44 4.02 30 3.89
New Hampshire 70 4.38 46 4.20 32 4.15
Vermont 19 1.19 5 0.46 8 1.04
Massachusetts/Rhode Island 1,432 89.67 985 90.04 692 89.75
Total 1,597 100 1,094 100 771 100
Source: US Department of Commerce – Bureau of the Census (1980), Census of Population und Housing, 5 per-
cent sample.
Table 3
1980 POPULATION, AVERAGE TAX RATES AND PER CAPITA PUBLIC GOODS
EXPENDITURE BY U.S. REGION11
Population Income Tax Consumption Tax
Per Capita Public
Goods
Northeast 54.6 4.0 3.0 $1129
Great Lakes 53.6 2.9 2.9 $1121
Plains 10.4 2.0 3.3 $1204
West 38.1 3.3 4.1 $1466
South 69.9 1.6 3.7 $1025
U.S. 226.5 2.7 3.4 $1155
1980 POPULATION, AVERAGE TAX RATES AND PER CAPITA PUBLIC GOODS
EXPENDITURE BY NEW ENGLAND REGION12
Population Income Tax Consumption Tax
Per Capita Public
Goods
Northeast 3.1 1.1 3.3 $993
Great Lakes 1.1 2.4 3.6 $877
Plains 6.7 4.4 2.1 $1066
West 0.9 1.0 0.0 $954
South 0.5 2.9 1.4 $1058
U.S. 12.3 3.1 2.3 $1022
Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1981, 1982 and 1983) and Chairman of the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisors (1990)
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PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE U.S. MODEL
GAMMA PARAMETERS. REGION OF POTENTIAL LOCATION
Region 
Northeast Great Lakes Plains West South
of Birth
Northeast 3.2652 4.9978 2.6061 2.3251
(0.0267) (0.1180) (0.0221) (0.0169)
Great Lakes 3.2869 3.2377 2.0619 2.4108
(0.0371) (0.0377) (0.0137) (0.0205)
Plains 3.1372 2.0165 1.2364 2.0276
(0.0833) (0.0252) (0.0186) (0.0252)
West 3.6588 3.5594 3.5429 2.9135
(0.1152) (0.0603) (0.0525) (0.0464)
South 2.5030 2.2798 4.3119 2.4972





Standard errors are in parentheses
Table 4a
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE NEW ENGLAND MODEL
GAMMA PARAMETERS. REGION OF POTENTIAL LOCATION
Region 
Maine Connecticut New Hampshire Vermont
Massachusetts/
of Birth Rhode Islans
Maine 2.9176 3.5973 5.9527 2.2436
(0.2087) (0.2798) (0.5064) (0.1324)
Connecticut 4.8880 5.3663 4.4888 2.5627
(0.1173) (0.2614) (0.3851) (0.1181)
New  2.4549 2.4408 3.2948 1.8537
Hampshire (0.1939) (0.3014) (0.4345) (0.1610)
Vermont 3.3444 2.4956 2.5077 1.8873
(0.4535) (0.1524) (0.1891) (0.1447)
Massuchusetts/ 3.7769 3.2013 3.4684 4.7118





Standard errors are in parentheses
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ESTIMATES OF LACATION DISTORTIONS FOR THE U.S.
Compensated Public Goods Percent of Percent of PVC*
Steady State
Case Percentage
Regional Taxes Allocation Total PVC* of Recolocators
Recolocating
1 No U.S. Regional .002 .139 1.06
Allocation
2 Yes Base Case .022 .585 3.69
Allocation
3 Yes Endogeous .026 .636 4.04
Allocation
4 Yes U.S. Regional .017 .489 3.37
Allocation
*: PVC stands for present of consumption
Table 5a
ESTIMATES OF LACATION DISTORTIONS FOR THE NEW ENGLAND.
Compensated Public Goods Percent of Percent of PVC*
Steady State
Case Percentage
Regional Taxes Allocation Total PVC* of Recolocators
Recolocating
1 No N.E. Regional .030 1.113 2.68
Allocation
2 Yes Base Case .026 .948 2.72
Allocation
3 Yes Endogeous .071 1.624 4.23
Allocation
4 Yes N.E. Regional .083 1.699 4.80
Allocation
*: PVC stands for present of consumption
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LOCATION CHOICE IN THE U.S. MODEL
Case  Northeast Great Lakes Plains West South
Base Case 11,060 10,764 2,048 7,557 13,571
1 11,011 10,695 2,043 7,781 13,470
2 10,640 10,858 2,195 7,125 14,182
3 10,598 10,862 2,220 7,076 14,244
4 10,598 10,797 2,204 7,340 14,061
Scaled Census 10,548 10,891 2,117 7,137 13,307
Data
Table 6a
LOCATION CHOICE IN THE NEW ENGLAND MODEL
Case Maine Connecticut New Hampshire Vermont
Massachusetts/
Rhode Islans
Base Case 4.938 9,870 2,763 1,773 25,656
1 4.473 10,207 2,943 1,820 25,557
2 4.924 10,101 3,106 1,804 25,065
3 4.889 10,182 3,482 1,823 24,624
4 4.427 10,460 3,314 1,859 24,940
Scaled Census 4.505 9,818 3,382 1,825 25,470
Data
Table 7
SENSITIBITY ANALYSIS FOR THE U.S.
EXCESS BURDEN
Case 3
Percent of Percent of PVCa Steady State
Total PVCa of Recolocators Percentage Recolocating
Doubling all Taxes .096 1.223 7.71
Doubling Income Tax in the Northeast .188 1.959 9.53
Doubling Consumption Tax in the West .1011 1.580 6.35
Doubling Consumption Tax in the West .238 2.135 11.02
and the Income Tax in the East
Doubling Total Public Goods Expenditure .029 .715 4.07
Case 4
Percent of Percent of PVCa Steady State
Total PVCa of Recolocators Percentage Recolocating
Setting α equal to β .019 1.936 .99
Setting β equal to .75α .035 .656 5.37
Multiplying α and β by 1.5 .022 .468 4.75
Multiplying α and β by .5 .010 .489 1.93
Doubling σ .017 .414 4.07
a: PVC stands for present of consumption
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SENSITIBITY ANALYSIS FOR NEW ENGLAND
EXCESS BURDEN
Case 3
Percent of Percent of PVCa Steady State
Total PVCa of Recolocators Percentage Recolocating
Doubling all Taxes .316 3.247 9.29
Doubling Income Tax in the Mass./R.I. .378 3.369 10.82
Doubling Consumption Tax in Maine .088 1.852 4.63
Doubling Consumption Tax in Maine .076 1.756 4.23
and the Income Tax in Mass./R.I.
Doubling Total Public Goods Expenditure .029 .715 4.07
Case 4
Percent of Percent of PVCa Steady State
Total PVCa of Recolocators Percentage Recolocating
Setting α equal to β .091 2.410 3.73
Setting β equal to .75α .108 1.950 5.43
Multiplying α and β by 1.5 .094 1.491 6.19
Multiplying α and β by .5 .057 2.035 2.77
Doubling σ .080 1.279 6.17
a: PVC stands for present of consumption
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